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Abstract 
We investigate the influence of financial development on non-performing loans using a global sample. The 
findings reveal that two financial development proxies, foreign bank presence and financial intermediation, are 
positively associated with non-performing loans. Among the determinants of non-performing loans, bank 
efficiency, loan loss coverage ratio, competition and banking system stability are inversely associated with 
NPLs while NPLs are positively associated with banking crises and bank concentration. In the regional analysis, 
NPLs are negatively associated with regulatory capital and bank liquidity, implying that banking sectors with 
greater regulatory capital and liquidity experience fewer NPLs 
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1. Introduction 
This study examines the influence of financial development on non-performing loans.  
Non-performing loans (NPLs) are important because they reflect the credit quality of the loan portfolio of banks, 
and in aggregate terms, reflect the credit quality of the loan portfolio of the banking sector in a country. An 
understanding of the factors that influence the level of non-performing loans is crucial for the risk management 
function of banks and for national bank supervisors responsible for banking stability. The determinants of non-
performing loans within and across countries is a major theme in the non-performing loan academic literature 
(Skarica, 2014; Louzis et al, 2012; Nkusu, 2011, etc). Also, the cyclicality of bank lending and the incidence of 
abnormal loan losses arising from bank lending have been of interest to policy makers in recent years; yet 
academic and policy studies have not examined the role of financial (sector) development in exacerbating or 
reducing systemic losses in a financial system particularly losses arising from massive non-performing loans 
among lending institutions.  
The level of financial development in a country is important because it can influence the severity of a financial 
or economic crisis and it can affect the domestic mobilisation of resources needed to tackle an existing crisis 
(Naude, 2009); hence, it is not surprising that financially developed countries recovered from the 2008 global 
financial crisis quicker than less financially developed countries (Naude, 2009). Prior to the 2008 financial 
crisis, aggregate non-performing loans for most countries were relatively low but increased significantly during 
and after the 2008 financial crisis1, compelling national banking supervisors to intervene to deal with the rising 
non-performing loan problem in their banking sectors. Despite the formulation of several national policy 
frameworks intended to mitigate rising non-performing loans such as the imposition of stringent capital 
requirements for banks (ECB, 2017), yet rising non-performing loans remain a major issue, which raises 
concern about the adequacy of existing policy solutions to mitigate rising non-performing loans. We argue that 
the level of financial development can provide some insight to improve our understanding of the persistence of 
non-performing loans.  
Financial development is important for bank profitability and efficiency (Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2000), 
and its importance has been highlighted by Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2000), Naceur and Omran (2011) and 
Ozili (2015). Moreover, in practice and in policy, non-performing loans arising from bank lending is an 
indicator of bank performance (BIS, 2017; Beck et al, 2015), and bank performance is also influenced by the 
level of financial sector development (Tecles and Tabak, 2010); therefore, it is important for policy makers to 
understand the role of financial development for the persistence of non-performing loans. A policy solution that 
takes into account the structure of the financial system and the level of financial development for banking sector 
performance can be effective (Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2000). Yet, policy debates on non-performing 
loans have paid little attention to the role of financial development for nonperforming loans, an indicator of 
banking performance. In this paper, we look at the influence of financial development on aggregate non-
performing loans. 
                                                          
1 See Appendix A1. 
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Given that the level of non-performing loan is an indicator of bank performance, i.e., the lower the better 
according to Beck et al (2015), we postulate that certain financial (sector) development characteristics can make 
it more probable for the banking sector to experience higher or fewer aggregate non-performing loans. Hence, 
we are interested in explaining the relationship between non-performing loans and financial development using 
country and regional data for nonperforming loans. We employ two datasets: data for 96 countries and data for 6 
regions of the world. Our measures of financial development are foreign bank presence (financial liberalisation), 
private credit by banks to GDP ratio (financial intermediation) and bank deposit to GDP ratio (size of banking 
sector). The findings reveal that non-performing loans are positively associated with financial development 
measured as (private credit by banks to GDP ratio, implying that banking sectors with greater financial 
development (via greater financial intermediation and foreign bank presence) experience higher non-performing 
loans. 
This study contributes to the literature on the determinants of NPLs and macro-financial feedback in two ways. 
One, we focus on the relationship between non-performing loans and financial sector development, an issue that 
remain unexplored in the literature. Two, we use two datasets and combine regional graphical analysis and 
global empirical analysis to analyse the association between NPLs and financial development during the 2003 to 
2014 period. Three, we introduce non-traditional banking sector determinants that potentially explain the 
behaviour of non-performing loans. From a policy standpoint, our analysis is of interest to policy makers for two 
reasons. First, our analysis on the relationship between aggregate non-performing loans and financial 
development is crucial for macro-prudential surveillance and can help policy makers in their evaluation of 
external factors beyond their control that influence the level of aggregate non-performing loans despite their 
micro-prudential policy efforts to reduce the size of NPLs. A thorough understanding of this relationship can 
provide some breakthrough to bank supervisors/regulators in their attempt to identify the causes of rising non-
performing loans and how to reduce non-performing loans in the banking sector. Finally, our analysis is relevant 
for the stress testing of bank loan quality. National bank supervisors should take into account the level of 
financial sector development in their stress-test scenarios in order to gain robust stress test results that can 
improve their understanding of what gives rise to non-performing loans in the banking sector.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the conceptual framework and the 
literature review on non-performing loans. Section 3 presents a description of the dataset and the econometric 
methodology used to estimate the influence of financial development on non-performing loans. Section 4 
discusses the results. Section 5 concludes. 
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2. Related Literature & Conceptual Framework 
2.1. Related Literature 
The literature on non-performing loans (NPLs) focus extensively on the macroeconomic and bank-level 
determinants of non-performing loans with little or no focus on the role of financial development for the 
persistence of non-performing loans. For instance, Nkusu (2011) investigate the determinants of non-performing 
loans across 26 developed countries over the 1998 to 2009 period and find that deteriorating macroeconomic 
conditions such as: economic growth and higher unemployment led to higher non-performing loans. Klein 
(2013), using country-level data, investigate 16 CESEE countries over the1998 to 2011 period and find that 
aggregate NPLs are negatively associated with credit growth, unemployment, gross domestic product growth 
rate and inflation. Louzis et al (2012) investigate the determinants of non-performing loans (NPLs) in the Greek 
banking sector for each loan category: consumer loans, business loans and mortgages, and find that non-
performing loans are significantly influenced by management quality, GDP, unemployment, interest rates and 
public debt. Skarica (2014), using country-level non-performing loans data, investigate the determinants of non-
performing loans among 7 countries in the Central and Eastern European (CEE) region during the third-quarters 
of 2007 and 2012 and find that higher non-performing loans are significantly associated with economic 
slowdown, unemployment and inflation. Beck et al (2015) examine the macroeconomic determinants of non-
performing loans (NPLs) across 91 countries and find that non-performing loans are significantly affected by 
real GDP growth, share prices, exchange rate and lending interest rate. Anastasiou et al (2016) focus on the 
Euro-area banking system during the 1990 to 2015 period and find that income tax and output gap 
significantly influence NPLs.  
In the literature, GDP growth rate is often associated with NPLs because NPLs are lower during economic 
booms and are higher during recessionary periods (see, Skarica, 2014; Ozili, 2015; Beck et al, 2015; etc). Also, 
high unemployment levels are associated with high non-performing loans because high unemployment can 
affect borrowers’ capacity to repay loans (Klein, 2013; Nkusu, 2011; Ozili, 2018). The effect of inflation on 
non-performing loans is inconclusive in the literature, with mixed evidence (see, Klein, 2013; Beck et al, 2015, 
etc.). Global risk-factors may also influence the persistence of non-performing loans. For instance, Espinoza and 
Prasad (2010) investigate 80 banks from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) region and employ the VIX 
proxy to control for global financial volatility and risk aversion. They find that non-performing loans are 
positively correlated with greater global financial volatility, implying that non-performing loans increases with 
global risk. 
Regarding bank-level determinants, Klein (2013) finds that capital adequacy measured as equity-to-asset ratio is 
negatively correlated with NPLs, implying that banks with relatively low capital have incentives to engage in 
risky lending behaviour which increases the incidence of non-performing loans. On the other hand, Boudriga et 
al (2009) investigate the cross-country determinants of nonperforming loans (NPLs) while controlling for the 
impact of banking supervision and institutional factors on credit risk exposure. They show that banking sectors 
with higher capital adequacy ratios and prudent loan loss provisioning report fewer non-performing loans. Ozili 
and Thankom (2018) show that European systemic banks, on average, have fewer NPLs than non-systemic 
banks because systemic banks have superior credit risk management systems to mitigate non-performing loans 
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compared to non-systemic banks. They also find a negative relationship between loan loss provisions and non-
performing loans for both systemic and non-systemic banks in Europe. Additionally, Klein (2013) shows that 
profitable banks have fewer NPLs because lower NPLs leads to higher interest income which subsequently 
improves overall profitability. Ozili (2018) investigates the determinants of banking stability, using NPLs as a 
stability indicator. Using data for 48 African countries, the study finds that bank efficiency, bank concentration, 
foreign bank presence, unemployment rate and the size of the banking sector are significant predictors of 
aggregate NPLs; however, higher government effectiveness, high competition and strong legal systems reduced 
the persistence of non-performing loans in the post-financial crisis period. 
The level of financial development in a country is important, and non-performing loan is an indicator of bank 
performance; therefore, some link between financial development and non-performing loans can be established. 
But, the literature that examine the relationship between firm/bank performance and financial development have 
not explored the role of financial development levels for the persistence of non-performing loans, hence, our 
understanding of how financial sector development affects non-performing loans is unclear in the literature. For 
instance, Naude (2009) demonstrate that the level of financial development is important because it can influence 
the severity of a financial or economic crisis and it can affect the domestic mobilisation of resources needed to 
tackle an existing crisis in a country. Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2000) and Naceur and Omran (2011) show 
that financial development is important for banking sector performance while Tecles and Tabak (2010) show 
that bank performance can be influenced by financial sector development. Moreover, because non-performing 
loans are also indicators of banking performance from a policy and regulatory standpoint (BIS, 2017), some 
studies attempt to link between non-performing loans and financial development. 
One study, Tanaskovic and Jandric (2015) use private credit to GDP ratio to control for financial sector 
development in their study of the macroeconomic and institutional determinants of NPLs for some countries in 
Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe (CESEE) during the 2006 to 2013 period. They find that NPL is 
negatively correlated with GDP and financial sector development, and positively associated with foreign 
currency loans ratio and exchange rate. Other scholars argue that foreign bank presence reflects financial 
development through financial liberalisation and can have some impact on non-performing loans. Giannetti and 
Ongena (2009) show that foreign firms are more inclined to fund low-risk borrowers that have promising 
projects rather than fund unpromising projects belonging to high-risk and well-connected or state-owned firms, 
and lending to low-risk borrowers with promising projects will reduce the risk of non-performing loans thus 
improving the asset quality of the firm. However, Giannetti and Ongena (2009)’s study did not examine the case 
of non-performing loans. Following their reasoning, one would expect that countries whose banking sectors are 
dominated by greater foreign bank assets will experience fewer aggregate non-performing loans. Accordingly, 
we control for foreign bank presence in our analyses to test this claim. Another study, Demirguc-Kunt and 
Huizinga (2000) investigate the relationship between financial development and structure on bank performance 
using bank-level data for developed and developing countries during 1990-1997 period and show that greater 
financial sector development is associated with lower profitability for banks reflecting increased efficiency due 
to increased competition. However, Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2000) did not examine the case of non-
performing loans. In contrast, our study is different because we take a shift from the extant literature to 
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investigate more directly the relationship between non-performing loans and financial (sector) development 
while controlling for traditional and non-traditional determinants of non-performing loans.  
Finally, we did not control separately for macroeconomic factors because we expect some causality and/or high 
correlation between financial development and macroeconomic indicators as indicated by Levine (1997), rather 
we deflated the financial development indicators by GDP, a macroeconomic indicator.  To this end, our analyses 
in this paper can be viewed as attempt to examine the relationship between financial development and bank 
performance, taking non-performing loans as a measure of bank performance. 
2.2. The Persistence of Non-Performing Loans 
NPL is an indicator of banks’ asset quality, and asset quality is an important indicator of the performance of the 
banking sector of a country amongst other performance indicators (ECB, 2017). In aggregate terms, the asset 
quality of a country’s banking sector is determined by its aggregate non-performing loan measured as the ratio 
of impaired loans to gross loans (Beck et al, 2015); however, the definition of non-performing loans will differ 
across countries2. The level of non-performing loans is of serious concern to bank regulators/supervisors due to 
its role in the failure of several systemic and non-systemic financial institutions around the world particularly 
during the 2007 to 2008 financial crisis (BIS, 2017). Some studies have analysed the behaviour of NPLs in 
several regions. 
2.2.1. Some Regional Evidence 
Klein (2013) focused on NPLs in the Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe (CESEE) region and observed 
that the persistence of NPL was driven by macroeconomic factors to a greater extent than bank-level factors, 
such as GDP growth, unemployment, and inflation. In Africa, Ozili (2017b) show that the level of non-
performing loan is a strong predictor of loan loss provision estimates for African banks. Makri et al (2014) focus 
on the Eurozone and find that both macroeconomic and bank factors equally explain the persistence of 
nonperforming loans in the Eurozone region. In the Asian region, Corsetti et al (2001) show that excessive non-
performing loans arising from the Asian banking system worsen the Asian crises of the 1990s. In the Middle 
East and North Africa (MENA) region, Creane et al (2004) show that MENA countries experience fewer 
nonperforming loans in their banking sector but this progress was rapidly outperformed by the banking sector of 
developed countries. Ozili (2018) use non-performing loans as a stability indicator, when investigating the 
determinants of banking stability in Africa. The study finds that bank efficiency, banking concentration, foreign 
bank presence and institutional quality are predictors of NPLs in the African region. 
2.2.2. Some Regional Statistics 
Several banking analysts expect the level of non-performing loans to increase in subsequent years after the 2008 
financial crisis. To confirm whether these expectations are true, we obtained some NPL data from the World 
Bank for different regions using the World Bank’s regional classification. Figure 1 reports the trend in aggregate 
NPLs over time. A closer look at aggregate NPLs across regions in Figure 1 confirm that the post-2008 financial 
                                                          
2 see 2012 report on NPLs by the European Banking Coordination “Vienna” Initiative. Available at: http://vienna-initiative.com/wp-
content/uploads/2012/08/Full-Forum-Meeting-of-the-European-Bank-Coordination-Vienna-2.0-Initative.pdf 
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crisis era witnessed significant increase in aggregate NPLs in some regions. Also, there is some consensus 
among regulators for the need to address the nonperforming loans problem at the individual bank level. One 
attempt to reduce the level of aggregate non-performing loans in a country would involve minimising the level 
of non-performing loans for each individual bank in the country. More so, any microprudential policy designed 
to address NPLs in the financial sector, should also take account the level of financial sector development in the 
country. This is because certain financial development characteristics/structures in a country can increase or 
reduce the likelihood of non-performing loans. Figure 2 show some association between non-performing loans 
and financial sector development indicators. Also, Figure 2 to 7 show that aggregate NPLs are inversely 
associated with financial intermediation (private credit to GDP ratio) and the size of the banking sector (bank 
deposits to GDP ratio) for the World, SSA, MENA, LAC and EAP regions while a positive association is 
observed for the ECA region in the post-crisis period.  For all regions, NPLs are inversely associated with return 
on equity (ROE) and return on assets (ROA). Subsequently, we empirically test this observed association to 
determine whether varying cross-country financial sector development indicators affect the level of aggregate 
non-performing loans.  
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Figure 1: Aggregate NPLs for all regions 
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Figure 1: NPLs for all regions over time (2003-2014)
World Sub-Saharan Africa (developing only)
Middle East & North Africa (developing only) Latin America & Caribbean (developing only)
Europe & Central Asia (developing only) East Asia & Pacific (developing only)
9 
 
Figure 2: World Region 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
In
d
ic
at
o
rs
 (
%
)
Year
Figure 2: World Region 
NPLs and financial sector development indicators
Bank deposits to GDP (%)
Bank nonperforming loans to gross loans (%)
Bank return on assets (%, after tax)
Bank return on equity (%, after tax)
Private credit by deposit money banks to GDP (%)
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Figure 3: Sub-Saharan African Region 
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Figure 3: Sub-saharan African Region
NPLs and financial sector development indicators
Bank deposits to GDP (%)
Bank nonperforming loans to gross loans (%)
Bank return on assets (%, after tax)
Bank return on equity (%, after tax)
Private credit by deposit money banks to GDP (%)
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Figure 4: Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region 
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Figure 4: Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region
NPLs and financial sector development indicators
Bank deposits to GDP (%)
Bank nonperforming loans to gross loans (%)
Bank return on assets (%, after tax)
Bank return on equity (%, after tax)
Private credit by deposit money banks to GDP (%)
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Figure 5: Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) region 
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Figure 5: Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) region
NPLs and financial sector development indicators
Bank deposits to GDP (%)
Bank nonperforming loans to gross loans (%)
Bank return on assets (%, after tax)
Bank return on equity (%, after tax)
Private credit by deposit money banks to GDP (%)
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Figure 6: Europe & Central Asia (EAC) region 
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Figure 6: Europe & Central Asia (EAC) region
NPLs and financial sector development indicators
Bank deposits to GDP (%)
Bank nonperforming loans to gross loans (%)
Bank return on assets (%, after tax)
Bank return on equity (%, after tax)
Private credit by deposit money banks to GDP (%)
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Figure 7: East Asia & Pacific (EAP) region 
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Figure 7: East Asia & Pacific (EAP) region
NPLs and financial sector development indicators
Bank deposits to GDP (%)
Bank nonperforming loans to gross loans (%)
Bank return on assets (%, after tax)
Bank return on equity (%, after tax)
Private credit by deposit money banks to GDP (%)
15 
 
3. Data and Method 
3.1. Data 
Data was obtained from the global financial development indicator in the World Bank database. As we are 
interested in the impact of financial development on aggregate non-performing loans from a cross country 
perspective, we use two datasets: (i) “cross-country panel data” that reflects a comprehensive global sample, and 
(ii) “regional panel data” to capture uniform characteristics across regions which might be ignored in cross-
country analyses. By panel data, we mean pooled cross-section and time series aggregate data for countries. The 
country panel data consists of 134 countries over the 2003 to 2014 period. The regional panel data consist of 
data for six (6) regions over the 2003 to 2014 period and the regions3 are: the World, Sub-Saharan Africa 
(developing countries only), Middle East and North Africa (developing countries only), Latin America and 
Caribbean (developing countries only), Europe and Central Asia (developing countries only) and East Asian and 
pacific (developing countries only) regions. In the analyses, we separate the two datasets and undertake separate 
cross-country and regional analyses. Our justification for separating the two datasets is to avoid double counting 
from the first category so that no country is included twice in the analyses. 
In the first dataset, aggregate NPL values for some countries are not reported in the World Bank database. Of 
the 134 countries, 38 countries do not have any reported data for non-performing loans and we exclude these 
countries from the sample. However, we include all countries with missing NPL data for some years and 
available NPL data for some years. This reduces the final country sample to 96 countries that have available 
data; implying that the data distribution is an unbalanced panel. See Appendix A3 for variable description. The 
summary of the descriptive statistics shows that the full country-sample NPL mean and World NPL mean are 
approximately the same in Panel A and B. Panel B shows that the level of financial development (PGDP and 
DGDP) is relatively low in Sub-Saharan Africa compared to other regions.  
Panel A 
Panel A: First-Sample Summary of Descriptive statistics 
 CI LD NII CAR NPL LLC DGDP PGDP CRISIS BCON ZSCORE FOREIGN LERNER 
Mean 54.9 104.8 35.9 15.8 6.3 70.4 62.1 60.1 0.1 69.7 11.4 38.1 0.3 
Median 54.9 89.4 34.6 15.1 3.7 60.2 47.8 47.2 0.0 69.3 9.4 27.0 0.3 
Maximum 218.1 879.7 80.0 43.4 45.3 322.1 479.7 262.5 1.0 100.0 41.8 100.0 0.9 
Minimum 0.0 17.7 0.0 1.8 0.1 0.0 6.10 2.0 0.0 23.4 -12.6 0.0 -1.6 
Std. Dev. 14.9 77.3 12.3 4.6 6.6 42.7 57.4 47.6 0.3 18.8 8.0 32.1 0.1 
Observations 1128 1108 1127 1005 994 924 1105 1117 864 1062 1131 796 921 
Panel A reports the aggregate descriptive statistics from the country dataset for the 2003 to 2014 period. All ratios are expressed in percentages for 
expositional convenience.   
 
 
 
                                                          
3 We take the regional classifications as given in the World Bank database, to avoid any bias that would be introduced if we had classified 
the regions by ourselves. 
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Panel B 
Panel B: Second-Sample Summary of Descriptive statistics (Regional) 
 CI LD NII CAR NPL LLC DGDP PGDP ZSCORE LERNER 
Regions mean mean mean mean mean mean mean mean mean mean 
SSA 58.44 69.49 43.86 16.19 7.63 52.1 19.145 15.72 7.77 0.29 
MENA 47.36 38.70 31.15 13.95 12.3 65.27 53.51 28.93 19.50 0.32 
LAC 61.98 87.46 30.05 15.22 3.46 121.43 38.72 31.59 13.61 0.25 
ECA 56.58 108.10 36.44 19.68 7.43 61.82 30.10 28.72 6.31 0.27 
EAP 48.13 82.05 30.14 15.69 5.81 52.19 38.36 33.10 9.89 0.32 
World 55.04 83.89 36.35 15.34 4.00 64.77 40.28 33.93 9.82 0.28 
Panel B reports the aggregate descriptive statistics from the regional dataset for the 2003 to 2014 period. All ratios are expressed in percentages for 
expositional convenience. SSA = Sub-Saharan African. MENA = Middle East and North Africa. LAC = Latin America and Caribbean. ECA = 
Europe and Central Asia. EAP = East Asian and Pacific. All regional data for 2003 to 2014 is available from Global Financial Development 
indicators at World Bank Database.  
 
3.2. Methodology 
To investigate the impact of financial development on non-performing loans, we use a modified version of the 
models of Ozili (2015), Beck et al (2015), Louzis et al (2012) and Anastasiou et al (2016) who together 
investigate some internal and external NPL determinants. Similarly, in our model specification, NPL is 
estimated as a function of internal and external determinants while controlling for financial development which 
is the variable of interest. The models are expressed as: 
𝑁𝑃𝐿 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1 𝐶𝐼 +  𝛽2 𝐿𝐷 +  𝛽3 𝑁𝐼𝐼 +  𝛽4 𝐶𝐴𝑅 +  𝛽5 𝐿𝐿𝐶 +  𝛽6 𝐷𝐺𝐷𝑃 +  𝛽7 𝑃𝐺𝐷𝑃 +  𝛽8 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆 
+  𝛽9 𝐵𝐶𝑂𝑁 +  𝛽10 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌 +  𝛽11 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁 +  𝛽12 𝐿𝐸𝑅𝑁𝐸𝑅 
+  𝑒                                                                 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (1) 
𝑁𝑃𝐿 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1 𝐶𝐼 +  𝛽2 𝐿𝐷 +  𝛽3 𝑁𝐼𝐼 +  𝛽4 𝐶𝐴𝑅 +  𝛽5 𝐿𝐿𝐶 +  𝛽6 𝐷𝐺𝐷𝑃 +  𝛽7 𝑃𝐺𝐷𝑃 +  𝛽8 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆 
+  𝛽9 𝐵𝐶𝑂𝑁 +  𝛽10 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌 +  𝛽11 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁 +  𝛽12 𝐿𝐸𝑅𝑁𝐸𝑅 +  𝛽13 𝑃𝐺𝐷𝑃 ∗ 𝐿𝐷 
+  𝛽14 𝐶𝐼 ∗ 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌 +  𝛽15 𝐷𝐺𝐷𝑃 ∗ 𝐵𝐶𝑂𝑁 
+  𝑒                                                                                 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (2) 
For the country dataset, the model in Equation (1) and (2) estimate the impact of financial development on non-
performing loans after controlling for bank-level determinants and the financial structure of the banking sector 
across countries. 
For the regional dataset, data for banking crisis, foreign bank presence and bank concentration are not available 
for each region; therefore, we adjust the model which is re-specified below in Equation (3) as: 
𝑁𝑃𝐿 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1 𝐶𝐼 +  𝛽2 𝐿𝐷 +  𝛽3 𝑁𝐼𝐼 +  𝛽4 𝐶𝐴𝑅 +  𝛽5 𝐿𝐿𝐶 +  𝛽6 𝐷𝐺𝐷𝑃 +  𝛽7 𝑃𝐺𝐷𝑃 
+  𝛽8 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌 +  𝛽9 𝐿𝐸𝑅𝑁𝐸𝑅 +  𝛽10 𝑃𝐺𝐷𝑃 ∗ 𝐿𝐷 +  𝛽11 𝐶𝐼 ∗ 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌 
+  𝑒                                                                                                      𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (3) 
We control for five determinants that potentially influence the level of non-performing loans at bank-level. The 
first determinant is cost to income ratio (CI) which reflects bank efficiency. Lin and Zhang (2009) use this 
variable to capture bank efficiency as a measure of bank performance. Efficient banks tend to report fewer non-
performing loans compared to inefficient banks, thus improving bank performance (Lin and Zhang, 2009; 
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Louzis et al, 2012; Karim et al, 2010); accordingly, we expect that countries with efficient banking sectors 
should have fewer aggregate non-performing loans; thus, we expect a positive association between NPL and CI. 
The second determinant is loan to deposit ratio (LD), measuring bank liquidity (Van den End, 2016). A too high 
LD ratio indicates that banks have liquidity problems, and liquidity difficulties of banks are often positively 
correlated with non-performing loans. Therefore, we expect that banking sectors with liquidity problems should 
have higher non-performing loans; hence, a positive association between aggregate NPL and banking sector 
liquidity is expected. Another determinant is non-interest income to total income (NII) ratio (see, Smith et al, 
2003; DeYoung and Rice, 2004; Ozili, 2017c). Banks that have significant exposure in non-interest source of 
income should have fewer non-performing loans, thus improving bank performance because they rely less on 
interest income associated with bank lending. Similarly, at country-level we expect that banking sectors with 
higher NII ratio should have fewer non-performing loans. We therefore expect a negative relationship between 
NPL and NII. The fourth determinant is regulatory capital (CAR). Bank capital ratio is an important determinant 
of bank performance (Boudriga et al, 2009; Klein, 2013; Ozili, 2017a). Compared to Boudriga et al (2009) and 
Klein (2013), we use risk-adjusted capital ratio and expect that banks with higher regulatory capital should have 
fewer non-performing loans because banks’ risk-adjusted capital should limit banks from risky lending that 
would otherwise lead to higher non-performing loans and reduced profitability (Ozili, 2017a). Following Ozili 
(2017a), we also expect that banking sectors with higher regulatory capital ratios should have fewer non-
performing loans, implying a negative relationship between NPL and CAR. Loan loss coverage ratio (LLC) 
measured as loan loss provisions to non-performing loans, is another determinant of non-performing loans, 
according to Caporale et al (2015). A high LLC ratio indicates that bank provisions are sufficient to protect 
banks from losses arising from rising non-performing loans (Ozili and Outa, 2017); therefore, banks with higher 
coverage ratios should be able to mitigate problems arising from losses associated with non-performing loans, 
hence, we expect a negative relationship between NPL and LLC. 
Next, we incorporate three financial (sector) development indicators into the model: (i) size of banking sector 
(DGDP) measured as bank deposit to GDP ratio (Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2000); (ii) extent of financial 
intermediation (PGDP) measured as private credit by domestic banks to GDP ratio (Demirguc-Kunt and 
Huizinga, 2000; Cihak et al, 2012) and (iii) foreign bank presence (FOREIGN) reflecting financial development 
via financial liberation measured as the ratio of foreign bank assets to total banking assets in the domestic 
country (Hermes and Lensink, 2004; Giannetti and Ongena, 2009). Foreign bank presence can mitigate 
connected-lending problems and improve capital allocation by channelling funds to high quality borrowers who 
are able to repay, thereby reducing the risk of non-performing loans (Giannetti and Ongena, 2009); therefore, we 
expect a negative relationship between NPL and FOREIGN. 
Next, we incorporate four financial structure indicators into the model: banking competitiveness, bank stability, 
banking concentration and banking crisis indicators. Banking competitiveness is measured by the Lerner index. 
Banks in highly competitive environments will take deliberate steps to minimise risks including non-performing 
loans in order to gain a favourable risk management perception from investors and regulators, compared to rival 
banks (Boyd and De Nicolo, 2005; Jimenez et al, 2013). Following this reasoning, countries with a more 
competitive banking sector should experience fewer non-performing loans. On the other hand, excessive 
competition can compel banks to engage in risky lending practices such as reducing their loan screening 
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procedures and using lax lending criteria which in turn would increase the likelihood of generating higher non-
performing loans (Manove et al, 2001; Bolt and Tieman, 2004). Given the two competing arguments, we do not 
have a definite prediction for the association between competition and non-performing loans. Banking stability 
is commonly measured by the z-score index in the literature, defined as the ratio of the return on assets plus the 
capital ratio divided by the standard deviation of the return on assets (Laeven and Levine, 2009; Foos et al, 
2009; Demirgüc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010; Ozili,2018). Higher Z-score values indicate increased banking 
stability and we expect that stable banking sectors should have fewer non-performing loans, implying a negative 
relationship between NPL and the STABILITY variable. Also, we control for banking concentration, but we do 
not have a definite prediction for this variable. We also control for banking crises and expect countries to have 
higher non-performing loans when they experience major financial/economic crises.  
The correlation matrix in Panel C shows that multicollinearity is not an issue in the analyses. Finally, the model 
is estimated using the panel OLS regression4 with country and year fixed effects applied. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
4 We also estimate the model using dynamic panel GMM regression and find results that are not statistically meaningful for the analysis; 
therefore, we exclude the results from the main analysis and base our inference from the fixed effect OLS regression results. The GMM 
regression is shown in Appendix A2.  
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Panel C: Pearson Correlation Matrix 
              
              Correlation CI LD NII CAR NPL LLC DGDP PGDP CRISIS BCON STABILITY FOREIGN LERNER 
CI 1.000             
              
              
LD -0.068 1.000            
 0.162             
              
NII 0.330*** -0.109** 1.000           
 0.000 0.025            
              
CAR 0.081* -0.178*** 0.119** 1.000          
 0.097 0.000 0.013           
              
NPL 0.0212 -0.142*** 0.072 0.176*** 1.000         
 0.662 0.003 0.140 0.000          
              
LLC 0.057 -0.021 0.029 0.042 -0.175*** 1.000        
 0.234 0.666 0.548 0.394 0.000         
              
DGDP -0.239*** -0.171*** -0.041 -0.173*** -0.190*** -0.186*** 1.000       
 0.000 0.000 0.395 0.000 0.000 0.000        
              
PGDP -0.218*** 0.374*** -0.077 -0.361*** -0.244*** -0.174*** 0.618*** 1.000      
 0.000 0.000 0.115 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000       
              
CRISIS 0.081* 0.140*** 0.038 -0.159*** 0.034 -0.187*** 0.226*** 0.4046*** 1.000     
 0.095 0.004 0.432 0.001 0.483 0.000 0.000 0.000      
              
BCON -0.042 0.019 0.113** 0.008 -0.031 -0.074 0.061 0.281*** 0.109** 1.000    
 0.385 0.690 0.019 0.874 0.518 0.129 0.209 0.000 0.024     
              
STABILITY -0.126** -0.059 -0.107** 0.051 -0.112** 0.054 0.325*** 0.149*** -0.088* 0.092* 1.000   
 0.009 0.221 0.026 0.294 0.021 0.266 0.000 0.002 0.068 0.057    
              
FOREIGN 0.119** -0.212*** 0.007 0.144*** 0.073 -0.131*** -0.066 -0.319*** -0.153*** -0.018 -0.212*** 1.000  
 0.014 0.000 0.884 0.003 0.130 0.007 0.173 0.000 0.002 0.704 0.000   
              
LERNER -0.427*** -0.128*** -0.196*** 0.264*** -0.033 0.109** 0.042 -0.091* -0.313*** 0.002 0.179*** 0.012 1.000 
 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.502 0.023 0.391 0.061 0.000 0.965 0.000 0.805  
T-statistics are reported in parenthesis. ***, **, * represent 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels 
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4. Empirical Results 
Section 4.1 presents the regression results for the cross-country analyses while section 4.2 presents the regional 
results.  
4.1. Cross-country Results 
Column 1 of Table 1 reports the regression result. CI coefficient is negative and significant, indicating that 
NPLs are inversely related to bank efficiency. This implies that countries that have efficient banking systems 
experience higher non-performing loans, and this result do not support the finding of Louzis et al (2012). LD 
and NII coefficients are negative but insignificant. LLC coefficient is negative and significant, indicating an 
inverse relationship between NPL and banks’ loan loss coverage ratio. This implies that banks in countries with 
higher loan loss coverage ratio experience fewer non-performing loans because they are better protected against 
losses arising from problem loans. This finding is consistent with the ideas of Ozili and Outa (2017). This 
finding is also relevant for the ongoing debate about which loan loss ratios serve as a better safety net to absorb 
losses, given two possible alternatives: the choice of loan loss coverage ratio or loan loss provision ratio. Our 
finding suggest that coverage ratios might be more sufficient than loan loss provisions since NPLs are directly 
included in the denominator of the computation of the loan loss coverage ratio.   
PGDP coefficient is positively significant and indicates that NPL has a positive relationship with the extent of 
financial intermediation. This implies that banking sectors with greater financial intermediation activities 
experience higher non-performing loans. This can be attributed to the lowering of loan screening standards and 
the use of lax lending criteria by banks to increase lending during good economic times, which also increases 
the likelihood of rising non-performing loans when unexpected events occur that affect the ability of borrowers 
to repay (Ozili, 2015). CRISIS coefficient is positively significant as expected and implies that countries that 
experience major banking crises have high non-performing loans. BCON coefficient is positively significant and 
implies that countries with concentrated banking systems experience higher non-performing loans. Ozili (2018) 
also find a positive and significant relationship between nonperforming loans and bank concentration. 
STABILITY coefficient is negatively significant as expected; and implies that non-performing loans are lower 
in countries that have a more stable banking sector.  
LERNER coefficient is negatively significant and indicates that countries with competitive banking systems 
experience fewer non-performing loans. This finding supports Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) and Jimenez et al 
(2013) who argue that banks in competitive environments can take deliberate steps to minimise risks including 
non-performing loans to gain a favourable risk management perception from investors and regulators, compared 
to rival banks. FOREIGN coefficient is positively significant and indicates that higher NPLs are associated with 
banking sectors with greater foreign bank assets, which of course, implies that countries with greater foreign 
bank presence have higher non-performing loans. The findings do not support Ozili (2018) who find negative 
relationship between foreign bank presence and non-performing loans. CAR coefficient reports a positive sign 
but is statistically insignificant. 
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Table 1: Non-performing loans and Financial Development: Cross County Analysis 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
c 9.074** 
(2.55) 
-0.807 
(-0.42) 
-0.473 
(-0.17) 
8.438** 
(2.15) 
11.543*** 
(3.22) 
6.901* 
(1.79) 
CI -0.105*** 
(-4.64) 
0.037** 
(1.94) 
 -0.104*** 
(-4.58) 
-0.169*** 
(-5.95) 
-0.101*** 
(-4.42) 
LD -0.010 
(-0.88) 
0.023** 
(2.47) 
 -0.005 
(-0.26) 
-0.011 
(-0.97) 
-0.013 
(-1.10) 
NII -0.024 
(-1.02) 
0.045** 
(2.51) 
 -0.024 
(-1.03) 
-0.042* 
(-1.77) 
-0.026 
(-1.08) 
CAR 0.107 
(1.55) 
0.214*** 
(3.57) 
 0.112 
(1.60) 
0.152** 
(2.22) 
0.108 
(1.57) 
LLC -0.022*** 
(-3.26) 
-0.030*** 
(-5.49) 
 -0.022*** 
(-3.19) 
-0.022*** 
(-3.37) 
-0.021*** 
(-3.16) 
DGDP -0.009 
(-0.36) 
 0.006 
(0.32) 
-0.011 
(-0.42) 
-0.014 
(-0.54) 
0.024 
(0.69) 
PGDP 0.068** 
(2.17) 
 0.064*** 
(2.89) 
0.076** 
(2.02) 
0.077** 
(2.50) 
0.077** 
(2.42) 
CRISIS 1.569** 
(2.12) 
 1.794*** 
(2.86) 
1.651** 
(2.15) 
1.209* 
(1.65) 
1.567** 
(2.12) 
BCON 0.058** 
(2.39) 
 0.059** 
(2.53) 
0.058** 
(2.37) 
0.055** 
(2.29) 
0.102*** 
(2.62) 
STABILITY -0.223** 
(-2.42) 
 -0.159** 
(-2.03) 
-0.225** 
(-2.43) 
-0.716*** 
(-4.38) 
-0.231** 
(-2.51) 
FOREIGN 0.059** 
(2.47) 
 0.038* 
(1.63) 
0.059** 
(2.42) 
0.068*** 
(2.86) 
0.062** 
(2.56) 
LERNER -12.351*** 
(-5.29) 
 -0.568*** 
(-4.59) 
-12.294*** 
(-5.25) 
-10.726*** 
(-4.59) 
-12.458*** 
(-5.34) 
LD*PGDP    -0.0001 
(-0.39) 
  
CI*STABILITY     0.009*** 
(3.63) 
 
BCON*DGDP      -0.001 
(-1.44) 
Country 
Fixed Effect? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year 
Fixed Effect? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R² 82.40 65.19 80.91 82.41 83.08 82.51 
Adjusted R² 77.37 60.09 76.17 77.32 78.18 77.45 
F-statistic 16.39 12.786 17.09 16.18 16.95 16.29 
Observations 424 862 464 424 424 424 
Column (1)-(6) report regression result for 96 countries for the 2003 to 2014 period and the countries included in the 
analysis are reported in Appendix A1. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis. ***, **, * represent 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance levels. Regression includes country and year fixed effects. Standard errors are not clustered. CI = cost to 
income ratio, representing bank efficiency. LD = bank loan to bank deposit ratio, representing banking sector liquidity. 
NII = Non-interest income to total income ratio, representing bank profit from non-loan sources. CAR = ratio of 
regulatory capital to risk-weight assets, representing regulatory capital. LLC = loan loss coverage measured as loan 
loss provisions to non-performing loan ratio, represents the ability of bank provisions to protect banks from losses 
arising from rising non-performing. DGDP = bank deposit to GDP ratio, representing the size of the banking sector. 
PGDP = private credit by banks to GDP ratio, representing the extent of financial Intermediation. CRISIS = dummy 
variable that takes the value 1 for countries that had experienced a major banking crisis, and 0 otherwise. BCON = 
banking concentration. STABILITY = Z-score indicator. FOREIGN = foreign bank assets to total banking asset, 
representing foreign bank presence. LERNER = banking competitiveness. 
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4.2. Further Tests 
4.2.1. Sensitivity Analysis 
Next, we separately regress NPL on its bank-level determinants only. Column 2 of Table 1 reports the results. 
All the bank-level variables are significant while LLC coefficient remains negatively significant, which is 
consistent with the earlier findings in Column 1. Also, we separately regress NPL on each financial 
development and financial structure indicators and exclude the bank-level determinants, and the result is 
reported in Column 3 of Table 1. We observe that PGDP and FOREIGN remain positively significant, 
confirming the earlier result in Column 1. Also, CRISIS, BCON, STABILITY and LERNER coefficients are all 
significant except DGDP, confirming the earlier results in Column 1. 
(Insert Table 1) 
4.2.2. Interaction Analysis 
From hindsight, we expect some complementarity among some variables, hence, the need for some interaction 
analyses. First, we expect countries with highly-liquid banking sectors to have greater financial intermediation 
activities and thus should have little or no need for government funding or bail-out funds. We therefore check 
whether non-performing loans are significantly fewer or higher in countries whose banking sectors are liquid 
and have greater financial intermediation. To do this, we interact the NPL variable with both the loan to deposit 
ratio (the liquidity indicator) and the private credit by banks to GDP ratio (the financial intermediation 
indicator). Column 4 of Table 1 reports the result. LD*PGDP coefficient is insignificant to draw any meaningful 
inference.  
Next, we expect that countries that have efficient banking sectors and greater stability should have fewer non-
performing loans. We test for this complementarity by interacting the NPL variable with bank efficiency ratio 
(CI) and the stability indicator. Column 5 of Table 1 reports the result. CI*STABILITY coefficient is 
surprisingly positive and significant, contrary to our expectation. This suggest that non-performing loans are 
positively associated with efficient and stable banking sectors. This finding may hold true if there are 
government guarantees on loans issued by banks to high risk sectors of a country, and banks would rely on the 
government to buy-up any losses arising from their lending to high risk sectors.  
Further, we test for potential complementarity between banking sector concentration and the size of the banking 
sector. This is because a large banking sector in several countries is often dominated by few large banks, hence, 
greater concentration. We test whether this complementarity has any significant impact on non-performing 
loans. We interact NPL with the banking concentration (BCON) and banking sector size (DGDP) indicators. 
Column 6 of Table 1 reports the result. BCON*DGDP coefficient is statistically insignificant, hence, no 
meaningful inference can be drawn. 
(Insert Table 1) 
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4.3. Regional Results 
Next, we introduce the second dataset into the analysis. A look at the regional dataset show that data for banking 
crisis, foreign bank presence, and banking sector concentration variables are not available, hence, the model is 
re-specified in Equation 3 in Section 3.2. Column 1 of Table 2 reports the regression result. LD coefficient is 
negatively significant and indicates that NPLs are inversely associated with bank liquidity, implying that 
banking sectors with higher liquidity have fewer non-performing. CAR coefficient is also negatively significant 
indicating an inverse association between NPLs and regulatory capital, implying that banks in countries with 
higher regulatory capital ratios experience fewer non-performing loans. The coefficient of the remaining 
variables is insignificant while LD*PGDP and CI*STABILITY coefficients are also insignificant in column 2 
and 3 of Table 2. Overall, the regional results indicate that liquidity risk and bank regulatory capital are 
significant determinants of nonperforming loans. However, the regional results only highlight average 
characteristics that are similar across all regions. Also, differences in business and risk dynamics in each 
country/region may influence the interpretation of the regional results. 
Table 2: Non-performing loans and Financial Development (Regional Analyses) 
 Pooled Regional Regression 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
c 37.127*** 
(3.61) 
38.254*** 
(3.67) 
41.312*** 
(2.68) 
CI -0.171 
(-1.58) 
-0.174 
(-1.60) 
-0.249 
(-1.04) 
LD -0.126** 
(-2.38) 
-0.201* 
(-1.88) 
-0.127** 
(-2.36) 
NII -0.102 
(-0.63) 
-0.055 
(-0.31) 
-0.095 
(-0.57) 
CAR -0.786*** 
(-2.79) 
-0.667** 
(-2.09) 
-0.784*** 
(-2.76) 
LLC -0.047 
(-1.13) 
-0.054 
(-1.32) 
-0.048 
(-1.15) 
DGDP 0.214 
(1.34) 
0.243 
(1.48) 
0.207 
(1.28) 
PGDP 0.144 
(1.01) 
-0.078 
(-0.25) 
0.150 
(1.04) 
STABILITY -0.121 
(-0.58) 
-0.065 
(-0.29) 
-0.454 
(-0.49) 
LERNER -4.236 
(-0.45) 
-3.875 
(-0.41) 
-5.622 
(-0.55) 
LD*PGDP  0.003 
(0.80) 
 
CI*STABILITY   0.007 
(0.37) 
Country 
 Fixed Effect? 
Yes Yes Yes 
Year 
 Fixed Effect? 
Yes Yes Yes 
R² 88.71 88.91 88.75 
Adjusted R² 80.97 80.77 80.48 
F-statistic 11.457 10.91 10.733 
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Observations 60 60 60 
Column (1)-(3) report regional regression result for 5 major regions of the world for the 2003 to 2014 period and the 
regions included in the analysis are reported in Appendix A1 namely Sub-Saharan Africa (developing countries only); 
Middle East and North Africa (developing countries only); Latin America and Caribbean (developing countries only); 
Europe and Central Asia (developing countries only); East Asian and pacific (developing countries only). T-statistics are 
reported in parenthesis. ***, **, * represent 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels. Regression includes country and year 
fixed effects. Standard errors are not clustered. CI = cost to income ratio, representing bank efficiency. LD = bank loan to 
bank deposit ratio, representing banking sector liquidity. NII = Non-interest income to total income ratio, representing 
bank profit from non-loan sources. CAR = ratio of regulatory capital to risk-weight assets, representing regulatory capital. 
LLC = loan loss coverage measured as loan loss provisions to non-performing loan ratio, represents the ability of bank 
provisions to protect banks from losses arising from rising non-performing. DGDP = bank deposit to GDP ratio, 
representing the size of the banking sector. PGDP = private credit by banks to GDP ratio, representing the extent of 
financial Intermediation. STABILITY = Z-score indicator. LERNER = banking competitiveness. 
 
4.4. Regions: Graphical Analysis 
This section discusses the trend results for each region in the graphical analyses from 2.2.2. We focus the 
discussion only on the variables of interest: non-performing loans and financial development.   
4.4.1. Aggregate NPL across all region 
Figure 1 shows that, prior to the global financial crisis, aggregate non-performing loans declined in all regions: 
the MENA, SSA, LAC, ECA, EAP and the World. After the crisis, nonperforming loans rose and remained at 
high levels until 2014 particularly in the European and Central Asian (ECA) region while the Middle East and 
North African (MENA) region also experienced substantial non-performing loans with a decline towards 2014. 
The observed rise in NPL in European banking (and in Asia) resonates with the European Central Bank’s most 
recent attempt to develop a methodology for the resolution of nonperforming loans (see ECB, 2017). 
(Insert Figure 1) 
4.4.2. NPL and Financial Development 
Figure 2 show that aggregate non-performing loans in the World region was low before the crisis but increased 
slightly during the crisis and remained stable afterwards up until 2014 while the level of financial development 
(proxy as private credit to GDP ratio) increased persistently before, during and after the crisis. This trend 
suggests a positive association between NPL and financial development in the post crisis period. National bank 
supervisors in this region should monitor these trends, act on it and take into account the business dynamics and 
risks that are peculiar to each region and country. 
(Insert Figure 2) 
For the sub-Saharan African region, figure 3 shows that aggregate non-performing loans declined before the 
crisis and further declined towards the end of 2014 while the level of financial development (proxy as private 
credit to GDP ratio) increased during and after the crisis. This trend indicates a negative association between 
NPL and financial development in the post crisis period. National bank supervisors in this region should 
monitor these trends and act on it and should take into account the business dynamics and risks that are peculiar 
to each country in Africa. 
(Insert Figure 3) 
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For the Middle East and North Africa region, figure 4 shows that aggregate non-performing loans declined 
before the crisis and remained relatively stable until 2014 while the level of financial development (proxy as 
private credit to GDP ratio) increased before the crisis, declined during the crisis and subsequently increased 
after the crisis. The pre-crisis trend indicates a negative association between NPL and financial development. 
National bank supervisors in this region should monitor these trends and act on it and should take into account 
the business dynamics and risks that are peculiar to MENA countries. 
(Insert Figure 4) 
In the Latin America and Caribbean region, figure 5 show that aggregate non-performing loans remained 
relatively stable from 2003 to 2013 but increased in 2014 while the level of financial development (proxy as 
private credit to GDP ratio) increased during and after the crisis up until 2013 but decline in 2014. National 
bank supervisors in this region should monitor these trends and act on it and should take into account the 
business dynamics and risks that are peculiar to each country in the Latin America and Caribbean region. 
(Insert Figure 5) 
For the Europe and Central Asian region, figure 6 shows that aggregate non-performing loans declined before 
the crisis and increased persistently until 2014 while the level of financial development (proxy as private credit 
to GDP ratio) increased persistently before, during and after the crisis. The trend indicates a positive association 
between NPL and financial development in the post-crisis period. National bank supervisors in this region 
should monitor these trends and act on it and should take into account the business dynamics and risks that are 
peculiar to each country in this region. 
(Insert Figure 6) 
For the East Asia and pacific region, figure 7 shows that aggregate non-performing loans declined persistently 
from 2003 through 2014 while the level of financial development (proxy as private credit to GDP ratio) 
increased after the crisis and experienced a sharp drop in 2012 and then increased subsequently, suggesting a 
negative association between NPL and financial development. National bank supervisors in this region should 
monitor these trends and act on it and should take into account the business dynamics and risks that are peculiar 
to each country in this region. 
(Insert Figure 7) 
4.5. Additional Test 
We also estimate the model using dynamic panel GMM regression and find results that are not statistically 
meaningful for the analysis; therefore, we exclude the results from the main analysis and base our inference 
from the fixed effect OLS regression results. The GMM regression result is reported in Appendix A2 
(Insert Table A2) 
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5. Conclusion 
The purpose of the study is to investigate the influence of financial development on non-performing loans. In 
the cross-country analysis, we find that two financial development proxies: foreign bank presence and financial 
intermediation are positively associated with non-performing loans, which imply that non-performing loans 
increases with greater financial development that take the form of greater foreign bank presence and greater 
financial intermediation. This could be due to weak supervision of the lending standards of all banks and non-
bank financial institutions actively involved in the financial intermediation process. Weak supervision 
encourages financial institutions to engage in lax lending standards which subsequently gives rise to non-
performing loans particularly when unexpected events sets in that affect borrowers’ ability to repay bank loans. 
Among the determinants of non-performing loans, bank efficiency, loan loss coverage ratio, competition and 
banking system stability are inversely associated with NPLs while NPLs are positively associated with banking 
crises and bank concentration. For the regional analyses, the graphical analysis shows that NPLs are negatively 
related to financial development while the empirical analysis does not show any significant relationship 
although NPLs are observed to be significantly associated with regulatory capital ratios and bank liquidity, 
implying that banking sectors with greater regulatory capital and liquidity experience fewer NPLs. Finally, 
national bank regulators/supervisor should not only take into account the role that financial development 
structures play in influencing aggregate non-performing loans but should also ensure that thorough supervision 
of the lending practices of banks is in place as well as the active monitoring of the financial intermediation 
process in the country.  
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Appendix 
A1: Non-performing loans (Trend) 
S/N Country Pre-Financial Crisis Crisis Post-Financial Crisis 
S/N Country 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
1 Algeria       21.1 18.3 14.4 11.7 10.6 9.2 
2 Argentina 17.7 10.7 5.2 3.4 2.7 3.1 3.5 2.1 1.4 1.7 1.7 2 
3 Australia 0.3 0.2 0.6 0.6 0.6 1.3 2 2.1 2 1.8 1.5 1.1 
4 Austria 3 2.7 2.6 2.7 2.2 1.9 2.3 2.8 2.7 2.8 2.9 3.5 
5 Bahrain      2.3 3.9 5.1 4.9 5.8 5.6 4.6 
6 Bangladesh 22.1 17.5       5.8 9.7 8.6 9.4 
7 Belarus 3.7 2.8 3.1 2.8 1.9 1.7 4.2 3.5 4.2 5.5 4.4 4.4 
8 Belgium 2.6 2.3 2 1.7 1.4 1.7 3.1 2.8 3.3 3.8 4.3 4.4 
9 Bolivia 16.7 14 11.3 8.7 5.6 4.3 3.5 2.2 1.7 1.5 1.5 1.5 
10 Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
8.4 6.1 5.3 4 3 3.1 5.9 11.4 11.8 13.5 15.1 14 
11 Botswana          2.6 3.6 4.1 
12 Brazil 4.1 2.9 3.5 3.5 3 3.1 4.2 3.1 3.5 3.4 2.9 2.9 
13 Bulgaria 3.2 2 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.4 6.4 11.9 15 16.6 16.9 16.7 
14 Burundi        9.4 7.4 8.2 9.9 10.9 
15 Cameroon        10.1 11.4 11.6 10.3 9.7 
16 Canada 1.2 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.8 1.3 1.2 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 
17 Chile 1.6 1.2 0.9 0.7 0.8 1 2.9 2.7 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.1 
18 China 20.4 13.2 8.6 7.1 6.2 2.4 1.6 1.1 1 1 1 1.2 
19 Colombia 6.8 3.3 2.7 2.7 3.2 3.9 4 2.9 2.5 2.8 2.8 2.9 
20 Congo, Rep.        1 1.1 1.5 1.2 2.5 
21 Costa Rica 1.7 2 1.4 1.4 1.2 1.5 2.1 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.6 
22 Croatia 8.9 7.5 6.2 5.2 4.8 4.9 7.7 11.1 12.3 13.8 15.4 16.7 
23 Cyprus      3.6 4.5 5.8 10 18.4 38.6 44.9 
24 Czech Republic 4.9 4 3.9 3.6 2.4 2.8 4.6 5.4 5.2 5.2 5.2 5.6 
25 Denmark 0.8 0.7 0.2  0.6 1.2 3.3 4.1 3.7 6 4.6 4.4 
26 Djibouti       9.3 8.3 9.4 11.4 14.5 18 
27 East Asia & Pacific 
(developing only) 
13.9 11.9 9.1 7.5 6.35 4.6 3.55 3.4 2.75 2.3 2.3 2.1 
28 Egypt, Arab Rep. 24.2 23.6 26.5 18.2 19.3 14.8 13.4 13.6 10.9 9.8 9.3 8.9 
29 Europe & Central 
Asia (developing 
only) 
7.35 6.3 3.8 3.5 3 4.2 7.15 10.2 9.85 9.8 11.6 12.4 
30 Finland 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5   
31 France 4.8 4.2 3.5 3 2.7 2.8 4 3.8 4.3 4.3 4.5 4.2 
32 Gabon 13.9 16 14.1 10.7 7.6 8.5 7.2 9.9 4.4 3.4 3.5  
33 Georgia 2.4 2 3.8 0.8 0.8 4.1 6.3 5.9 4.5 3.7 3 3 
34 Germany 5.2 4.9 4.1 3.4 2.7 2.9 3.3 3.2 3 2.9 2.7 2.3 
35 Ghana 18.3 16.3 13 7.9 6.4 7.7 16.2 17.6 14.1 13.2 12 11.3 
36 Greece 7 7 6.3 5.4 4.6 4.7 7 9.1 14.4 23.3 31.9 33.8 
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37 Grenada      3.46 5.9 7.6 9.4 11.8 13.8 14.6 
38 Guatemala 6.5 7.1 2.4 2.3 1.6 2.2 2.7 2.1 1.6 1.3 1.2 1.3 
39 Honduras    4 3.1 4.3 4.7 3.7 2.9 3.3 3.4 3.3 
40 Hong Kong SAR, 
China 
3.9 2.3 1.4 1.1 0.8 1.2 1.6 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.5 
41 Hungary 2.6 1.8 2.3 2.6 2.3 3 8.2 10 13.7 16 16.8 15.6 
42 Iceland 2.1 0.9 1.1 0.8   14.1 18.3 11.6 6.3 4.3  
43 India 8.8 7.2 5.2 3.5 2.7 2.4 2.2 2.4 2.7 3.4 4 4.3 
44 Indonesia 6.8 4.5 7.6 6.1 4 3.2 3.3 2.5 2.1 1.8 1.7 2.1 
45 Ireland 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.8 1.9 9.8 13 16.1 25 25.7 20.7 
46 Israel 2.6 2.5 2.3 2 1.5 1.5 1.4 3.1 3.4 3.5 2.9 2.2 
47 Italy 6.7 6.6 5.3 6.6 5.8 6.3 9.4 10 11.7 13.7 16.5 17.3 
48 Japan 5.2 2.9 1.8 1.8 1.5 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.3 1.9 
49 Jordan 15.5 10.3 6.6 4.3 4.1 4.2 6.7 8.2 8.5 7.7 7 5.6 
50 Kenya 34.9 29.3   10.6 8.8 8 6.3 4.4 4.6 5 5.5 
51 Korea, Rep. 2.6 1.9 1.2 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 
52 Latin America & 
Caribbean 
(developing only) 
6.65 4.85 3.1 3.3 2.7 3.1 3.7 3 2.9 2.8 2.8 2.6 
53 Lebanon  17.7 16.4 13.5 10.1 7.5 6 4.3 3.8 3.8 4 4 
54 Lesotho  1 3 3 3 1.8 3 3 2.1 2.5 3.7  
55 Luxembourg 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.2  
56 Macedonia 22.4 17 15 11.2 7.5 6.7 8.9 9 9.5 10.1 10.9 10.8 
57 Malaysia 13.9 11.7 9.4 8.5 6.5 4.8 3.6 3.4 2.7 2 1.8 1.6 
58 Malta  6.5 7.4 5.9 5.9 5.5 5.8 7 7.1 7.8 8.9 9 
59 Mauritania        45.3 39.2 25.7 20.4  
60 Mauritius    3 2.5 2 3.3 2.8 2.8 3.6 4.2 4.9 
61 Mexico 3.2 2.5 1.5 1.8 2.3 3 2.8 2 2.1 2.4 3.2 3 
62 Middle East & 
North Africa 
(developing only) 
21.45 19.4 16.4 12.2 9 7.5 11.25 10.65 10.15 10.6 9.95 9.05 
63 Morocco 18.7 19.4 15.7 10.9 7.9 6 5.5 4.8 4.8 5 5.9 6.9 
64 Mozambique 14.4 5.9 3.5 3.1 2.6 1.9 1.8 1.9 2.6 3.2 2.3 3.3 
65 Namibia 3.9 2.4 2.3 2.6 2.8 3.1 2.7 2 1.5 1.3 1.3 1.5 
66 Netherlands 2 1.5    1.7 3.2 2.8 2.7 3.1 3.2 3.1 
67 New Zealand     0.3 0.9 1.7 2.1 1.7 1.4 1 0.9 
68 Nigeria 20.5 21.6  9.3 9.5 6.3 37.3 20.1 5.8 3.7 3.4 3 
69 Norway 1.6 1 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.7 1.3 1.5 1.7 1.5 1.3 1.1 
70 Paraguay 20.6 10.8 6.5 3.3 1.3 1.1 1.6 1.3 1.7 2.1 2 1.8 
71 Peru 14.8 9.5 6.3 4.1 2.7 2.2 2.7 3 2.9 3.2 3.5 4 
72 Philippines 16.1 14.4 10 7.5 5.8 4.6 3.5 3.4 2.6 2.2 2.4 2 
73 Poland 21.2 14.9 11 7.4 5.2 2.8 4.3 4.9 4.7 5.2 5 4.8 
74 Portugal 2.4 2 1.5  2.8 3.6 4.8 5.2 7.5 9.8 10.6 11.9 
75 Qatar      1.2 1.7 2 1.7 1.7 1.9 1.7 
76 Romania 8.3 8.1 1.4 1.8 2.6 2.7 7.9 11.9 14.3 18.2 21.9 13.9 
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77 Rwanda 33 31 29 25 16.9 12.6 13.1 11.3 8.2 6 7 5.2 
78 Senegal 13.3 12.6 11.9 16.8 18.6 17.4 18.7 20.2 16.2 18.4 19.1 20.3 
79 Seychelles    4.4 2.3 2 3.8 5.5 8.1 9 9.2 8 
80 Sierra Leone 7.4 16.5 26.8 26.9 25.6 17.9 10.6 15.6 15.1 14.7 22.4 33.4 
81 Singapore 6.7 5 3.8 2.8 1.5 1.4 2 1.4 1.1 1 0.9 0.8 
82 Slovenia 3.7 3 2.5   4.2 5.8 8.2 11.8 15.2 13.3 11.7 
83 South Africa 2.4 1.8 1.8 1.1 1.4 3.9 5.9 5.8 4.7 4 3.6 3.2 
84 Spain 1 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.9 2.8 4.1 4.7 6 7.5 9.4 8.5 
85 Sri Lanka         3.8 3.6 5.6 4.2 
86 Sub-Saharan Africa 13.6 12.6 7 7.7 6.95 6.95 7.6 8.6 5.6 4.6 5.1 5.2 
87 Swaziland 2 7.2 7 7.7 7.5 7.6 8.6 7.8 7.5 9.7 6.8 6.9 
88 Sweden 1.9 1.1 0.8 0.8 0.1 0.5 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.6 1.2 
89 Switzerland 1.3 0.9 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.9 1.1 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 
90 Tanzania        7.8 5.4 6.4 5.1 6.6 
91 Thailand 13.5 11.9 9.1 8.1 7.9 5.7 5.2 3.9 2.9 2.4 2.3 2.3 
92 Tunisia 24.2 23.6 20.9    13.2 13 13.3 14.9 15.2 15.8 
93 Turkey 11.5 6.5 5 3.9 3.3 3.4 5 3.5 2.6 2.7 2.6 2.7 
94 Uganda 7.2 2.2 2.3 2.9 4.1 2.2 4.2 2.1 2.2 4.2 5.6 4.1 
95 Ukraine 28.3 30 5.6 4 3 3.9 13.7 15.3 14.7 16.5 12.9 19 
96 United Arab 
Emirates 
14.3 12.5 8.3 6.4 2.6 2.3 4.3 5.6 7.2 8.4 7.3 6.5 
97 United Kingdom 2.5 1.9 1 0.9 0.9 1.6 3.5 4 4 3.6 3.1 1.8 
98 United States 1.1 0.8 0.7 0.8 1.4 3 5 4.4 3.8 3.3 2.5 1.9 
99 Uruguay 14.3 4.7 5.6 3.7 1.1 1 3.8 2.4 1.5 1.3 1.3  
100 Vietnam      2.2 1.8 2.1 2.8 3.4   
101 World 5.75 4.2 3.5 3.1 2.7 3 4.3 4.55 4.1 4.1 4.4 4.35 
102 Yemen, Rep.      18 13.9 17.7 21.2 25.5 21.7 24.7 
103 Zambia        14.8 10.4 8.1 7  
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A2: Non-performing loans and Financial Development 
We also estimate the model using dynamic panel GMM regression and find results that are not statistically meaningful 
for the analysis; therefore, we exclude the results from the main analysis and base our inference from the fixed effect 
OLS regression results. The GMM regression is shown in Appendix A2 
Pooled Country-Sample GMM Result 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
NPLt-1 0.589*** 
(8.89) 
0.582*** 
(7.635) 
0.518*** 
(-11.51) 
0.655*** 
(8.21) 
0.596*** 
(8.78) 
0.614*** 
(8.90) 
CI -0.062 
(-1.17) 
0.005 
(1.08) 
 -0.075 
(-1.44) 
-0.045 
(-0.51) 
-0.055 
(-1.06) 
LD 0.045 
(0.95) 
0.046*** 
(7.74) 
 0.144 
(1.51) 
0.059 
(1.08) 
0.067 
(1.09) 
NII -0.017 
(-0.16) 
0.059*** 
(6.21) 
 -0.059 
(-0.55) 
-0.005 
(-0.05) 
-0.063 
(-0.54) 
CAR 0.064 
(0.42) 
0.153*** 
(7.75) 
 0.096 
(0.60) 
0.084 
(0.37) 
0.115 
(0.63) 
LLC 0.037 
(1.56) 
-0.038*** 
(-8.03) 
 0.020 
(0.74) 
0.035 
(1.47) 
0.036 
(1.47) 
DGDP -0.096 
(-0.72) 
 -0.247*** 
(-3.79) 
-0.082 
(-0.63) 
-0.081 
(-0.57) 
-0.012 
(-0.06) 
PGDP 0.200 
(1.41) 
 0.319*** 
(3.93) 
0.291* 
(1.86) 
0.178 
(1.16) 
0.139 
(0.81) 
CRISIS -2.085 
(-0.76) 
 -1.601 
(-0.84) 
-1.173 
(-0.40) 
-1.608 
(-0.58) 
-1.853 
(-0.65) 
BCON 0.225*** 
(3.38) 
 0.182*** 
(4.35) 
0.249*** 
(3.64) 
0.219*** 
(2.98) 
0.352* 
(1.87) 
STABILITY 0.032 
(0.11) 
 -0.494*** 
(-3.33) 
0.072 
(0.26) 
0.130 
(0.34) 
0.068 
(0.23) 
FOREIGN -0.141 
(-1.38) 
 -0.113* 
(-1.69) 
-0.081 
(-0.74) 
-0.171 
(-1.54) 
-0.108 
(-0.95) 
LERNER -30.77*** 
(-5.92) 
 -25.59*** 
(-7.29) 
-31.89*** 
(-5.92) 
-30.91*** 
(-5.78) 
-34.83*** 
(-4.25) 
LD*PGDP    -0.001 
(-1.20) 
  
CI*STABILITY     -0.003 
(-0.37) 
 
BCON*DGDP      -0.002 
(-0.73) 
Country 
 Fixed Effect? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year 
 Fixed Effect? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
J-statistic 12.71 50.44 20.95 11.34 12.86 12.65 
P(J-statistic) 0.625 0.416 0.399 0.658 0.538 0.554 
Observations 332 683 364 332 332 332 
Column (1)-(6) report regression result for 96 countries for the 2003 to 2014 period and the countries included in the 
analysis are reported in Appendix A1. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis. ***, **, * represent 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance levels. GMM first-difference regression. Regression includes country first-difference and year fixed 
effects. Standard errors are not clustered.  
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A3: Data description and source 
Indicator  Indicator Name Source 
BCON Bank concentration Global financial development indicator archived in 
World Bank database. 
CI Bank cost to income ratio, measuring efficiency. Global financial development indicator archived in 
World Bank database. 
LD Bank credit to bank deposits ratio, measuring 
banking sector liquidity. 
Global financial development indicator archived in 
World Bank database. 
DGDP Bank deposits to GDP ratio, measuring size of 
banking sector 
Global financial development indicator archived in 
World Bank database. 
NPL Bank nonperforming loans to gross loans ratio Global financial development indicator archived in 
World Bank database. 
NII Bank noninterest income to total income ratio, 
measuring bank profitability from non-loan sources 
Global financial development indicator archived in 
World Bank database. 
CAR Bank regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets ratio, 
measuring bank capital regulation  
Global financial development indicator archived in 
World Bank database. 
CRISIS Banking crisis dummy (1=banking crisis, 0=none) Global financial development indicator archived in 
World Bank database. 
FOREIGN Foreign bank assets among total bank assets ratio, 
measuring financial liberalisation  
Global financial development indicator archived in 
World Bank database. 
LERNER Lerner index, measuring competition Global financial development indicator archived in 
World Bank database. 
LLC Provisions to nonperforming loans ratio, measuring 
loan loss coverage ratio 
Global financial development indicator archived in 
World Bank database. 
PGDP Private credit by deposit money banks to GDP ratio, 
measuring extent of financial intermediation 
Global financial development indicator archived in 
World Bank database. 
STABILITY Bank Z-score, measuring banking stability Global financial development indicator archived in 
World Bank database. 
 
